Connectivity Competition between the European Union and China in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Governance Outcomes and Adaptive Development Pathways

Connectivity initiatives increasingly constitute a key institutional dimension of Europe–Asia interregional engagement, shaping regulatory cooperation, development coordination, and infrastructure governance across the Indo-Pacific. While existing scholarship has widely examined geopolitical competition among major powers in Southeast Asia, comparatively limited attention has been paid to how competing connectivity models influence governance incentives and development outcomes in recipient regions. Focusing on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), this article analyzes how the interaction between alternative connectivity architectures generates differentiated governance incentive structures that shape institutional adaptation and development pathway diversification across recipient economies. Drawing on a qualitative comparative framework combining policy-document analysis, institutional assessment, and process tracing, the study evaluates the governance effects of connectivity competition across three dimensions as regulatory upgrading, infrastructure and financing diversification, and institutional capacity development. The findings indicate that interacting connectivity initiatives rarely generate exclusive alignment outcomes; instead, they enable countries to assemble diversified development strategies by selectively combining infrastructure investment, regulatory cooperation, and institutional partnerships. The article contributes to connectivity governance scholarship by developing a governance-outcomes comparative analytical framework applicable to interregional infrastructure politics.